Kinder Morgan is in a direct conflict of interest and the NEB is deliberately hiding it

Hi,

I’ve been working on NEB issues, and yesterday gave a talk on Pender about
tanker risks. As part of this talk, I made a couple of graphics, below, to
share the fact that Kinder Morgan would PROFIT from an oil $pill on the BC
coast, through their ownership in both the primary terrestrial and marine
oil spill response corporations in Western Canada. They are in a DIRECT
conflict of interest.

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Pipeline too close to home for co-op

Lil Cameron had the feeling something was up when she saw surveyors out on Government Street on Wednesday.

That was followed on Thursday morning in the same area by a crew using unmarked vehicles. They were spray painting orange blotches every few feet on the ivy covering the concrete retaining wall that borders the Halston Hills Housing Co-operative where she lives.

Cameron approached City of Burnaby workers who were working on a fire hydrant nearby and asked what was going on at the wall. “They said, ‘It’s not us, it’s Kinder Morgan.’ “

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BILL C-51 BACKGROUNDER #5: OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW: TURNING ACCOUNTABILITY GAPS INTO CANYONS?

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571245

Social Science Research Network

Craig Forcese    University of Ottawa – Common Law Section
Kent Roach     University of Toronto – Faculty of Law
Leah Sherriff     University of Toronto
February 27, 2015

Canada’’s system of national security ““oversight”” is imperfect. Its system of national security ““review”” is frayed, perhaps to the breaking point. The government’’s anti-terrorism law, bill C-51, will accelerate this pattern. Without a serious course correction, we risk the prospect of avertable security service scandals.

There is often a misunderstanding about the distinction between “”oversight”” and “”review”.”

In Canadian practice, oversight is usually an executive branch function. This system has not always worked – the Air India Commission suggested (and the government rejected) new centralized oversight systems for reconciling competing national security interests.

C-51 does not introduce new reforms in this area. The government instead points to judicial warrants authorizing the new CSIS powers – a form of oversight. But this is, at best, a partial form of oversight. CSIS will not always require warrants. Judges will issue warrants in secret proceeding in which only the government side is represented. Nor will they always know what is then done in their name. There is no formal “”feedback”” loop between CSIS and the judge concerning the execution of the warrant, a key concern where (as with CSIS warrants) the conduct is covert and the warrant never disclosed.

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Bill C-51 A Legal Primer: Overly broad and unnecessary anti-terrorism reforms could criminalize free speech

C. Ruby , N. R. Hasan
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
February 17, 2015
Bill C-51: A Legal Primer

by Clayton Ruby and Nader R. Hasan

Six Muslim young adults stand in front of a mosque late at night in heated discussion in some foreign language. They may be debating the merits of a new Drake album. They may be talking about video games, or sports, or girls, or advocating the overthrow of the Harper government. Who knows? There is no evidence one way or the other. Just stereotypes. But the new standard for arrest and detention – reason to suspect that they may commit an act – is so low that an officer may be inclined to arrest and detain them in order to investigate further. And now, officers will no longer need to ask themselves whether the arrest is necessary. They could act on mere suspicion that an arrest is likely to prevent any terrorist activity. Yesterday, the Muslim men were freely exercising constitutional rights to freedom of expression and assembly. Today they are arrestable.

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